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During the 106th Congress, two database protection bills were pending
before the U.S. House of Representatives: H.R. 354,1 introduced by
Representative Howard Coble (6th District of North Carolina), and H.R. 1858,2
introduced by Representative Tom Bliley (7th District of Virginia). These bills
differed significantly in approach and scope. This paper summarizes the
background of the debate, compares the two bills, and discusses the possible
global ramifications of legislation in this area.
I. BACKGROUND
A. The Status Quo
Historically, America's basic information policy has been that facts reside in
the public domain. This allows a second-generation publisher to extract facts from
an existing compilation for reuse in its own compilation. Facts are viewed as the
building blocks of knowledge that everyone is free to use and reuse.
Nonetheless, a database publisher has four ways of protecting his investment
in collecting facts. First, the publisher can rely on copyright. Copyright protects
the original selection, coordination, and arrangement of the facts in a compilation,
but not the facts themselves. Thus, copyright usually prevents the wholesale
copying of a database-which typically contains at least a minimal amount of
original expression-but not the extraction and reuse of individual facts.
Second, the publisher can rely on contracts. Many databases, particularly
online databases, are distributed subject to license agreements under which the
licensee-the user-agrees not to re-disseminate the information.
Third, the publisher can rely on state common law misappropriation. Under
this doctrine, the collector can prevent competitors from copying "hot-news" or
other time sensitive information.3 Additionally, courts are increasingly
recognizing claims of "trespass to chattels" when information is extracted without
authorization from a website4
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1 Collections of Information Antipiracy Act, H.R. 354, 106th Cong. (1999).
2 The Consumer and Investor Access to Information Act, H.R. 1858, 106th Cong. (1999).
3 See NBA v. Motorola, 105 F.3d 841 (2d Cir. 1997).
4 See eBay, Inc. v. Bidder's Edge, Inc., 100 F.Supp. 2d 1058 (N.D. Cal. 2000).
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Fourth, the publisher can rely on technological measures. These measures are
particularly effective with respect to online databases, where the publisher can
limit the user's access to relatively small amounts of information at any one time.
These limitations impede the copying of the database as a whole. Technological
measures now receive legal protection under the Digital Millennium Copyright
Act (DMCA).5 The DMCA created a new chapter 12 to the Copyright Act, which
prohibits the manufacture and sale of devices that are designed to circumvent
technological protection measures.
B. The Feist Decision
Until 1991, the collector could rely on yet another legal doctrine: "sweat of
the brow." In a few circuits, courts interpreted the Copyright Act6 as preventing
the copying of facts in a compilation in which there were no original elements in
selection or arrangement.7 Courts in these jurisdictions thought it was unfair and
unwise to afford no protection to the efforts of people who assembled plain
vanilla directories. It is important to note that "sweat of the brow" was largely a
stop-gap measure; courts typically applied it to compilations that lacked any
expression and that were copied in their entirety.
In 1991, however, in Feist v. Rural Telephone,8 the Supreme Court found the
sweat of the brow doctrine unconstitutional. A unanimous Court held that under
the copyright clause of the Constitution, copyright protection could extend only to
expressive elements in compilations and that effort without creativity could not
convert facts into expression. Notwithstanding the unconstitutionality of the sweat
of the brow doctrine, the database industry in the U.S. has continued to grow,
largely because of the protection afforded by copyright contract state common
law, and technology, as discussed above. Nonetheless, some database publishers
have sought to restore the protection afforded by the sweat of the brow doctrine.
C. EUDatabase Directive
This effort gained significant momentum in 1996, when the European Union
adopted its Database Directive.9 Under this regime, a second-generation publisher
5 Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998) (codified in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.);
H.R. 2281, 195th Cong. (1998). Title I of the DMCA, 17 U.S.C. §§ 1201-05, amended title 17
of the United States Code to implement the World Intellectual Property Organization Copyright
Treaty and Performance and Phonograms Treaty.
6 17 U.S.C. § 101 et seq.
7 See Harper House, Inc. v. Thomas Nelson, Inc., 889 F.2d 197 (9th Cir. 1989);
Hutchinson Tel. Co. v. Fronteer Directory Co., 770 F.2d 128 (8th Cir. 1985).
8 499 U.S. 340 (1991).




could not extract or reuse a qualitatively or quantitatively substantial part of a first
generation database, even if the second publisher did not extract or reuse any
protectable expression. The Database Directive's sui generis protection is
available only on a reciprocity basis. That means a non-EU publisher can receive
the heightened level of protection only if the publisher's country of origin
afforded an equivalent level of protection. In other words, if the U.S. does not
enact database legislation on par with the Database Directive, then U.S.
publishers cannot receive this added protection in Europe.
There is, however, a loophole in this reciprocity requirement. If a non-EU
publisher has a subsidiary operating in the EU, then databases distributed by the
subsidiary should be able to receive the heightened protection.
In response to the EU Directive, Representative Carlos Moorhead (27th
District of California) introduced H.LR. 353110 in the 104th Congress. H.R. 3531
would have established a sui generis database protection regime even more
stringent than that of the Directive; H.R. 3531 proposed a twenty-five-year term
of protection, while the Directive establishes a fifteen-year term of protection.
H.R. 3531 died with the end of the 104th Congress without further discussion.
Additionally, the EU and the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office suggested
that a database treaty modeled on the EU Database Directive be placed on the
agenda of the 1996 World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) Diplomatic
Conference. At the beginning of the conference, however, discussion of a
database treaty was deferred because too many other items relating to the
Copyright Treaty and the Performances and Phonograms Treaty needed to be
resolved. Moreover, representatives from other regions contended that discussion
of a database treaty was premature.
D. HR. 2652
In the 105th Congress, database protection reappeared in the form of
H.R. 2652,11 introduced by Representative Howard Coble, Chairman of the
House Subcommittee on Courts and Intellectual Property. Although the
legislation was styled as a misappropriation bill based on a tort rather than an
intellectual property right theory, the substantive tests were almost identical to
those of H.R. 3531. H.R. 2652 received support only from a limited number of
large database publishers such as Reed Elsevier (the Anglo-Dutch owner of
Lexis-Nexis) and Thomson (the Canadian owner of West).
Value-added publishers and the science, education, and library communities
argued that H.R. 2652 was unnecessary-that copyright, contract, common law
misappropriation, and technology provided databases with adequate protection.
10 Database Investment and Intellectual Property Antipiracy Act of 1996, HR. 3531,
104th Cong. (1996).
11 Collections of Information Antipiracy Act, HR 2652, 105th Cong. (1997).
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Moreover, these opponents contended that the database industry was healthy and
that there was no market failure that required legislative correction.
Nonetheless, H.R. 2652 passed the House twice--once as a stand-alone bill,
and the second time as part of the House's version of the Digital Millennium
Copyright Act. At this point the Department of Commerce, the Department of
Justice, and the Federal Trade Commission all registered serious concerns with
the bill.12 In the House-Senate conference on the DMCA in the closing days of
the 105th Congress in October 1998, the database portion was dropped.
13
II. THE DATABASE BILLS BEFORE THE 106TH CONGRESS
A. H.R. 354: The Collections ofInformation Antipiracy Act
On January 19, 1999, Chairman Coble introduced H.R. 354, which was very
similar to H.R. 2652. Under H.R. 354, a person could not (i) make available to
others (ii) a substantial part (iii) of a collection of information gathered or
maintained by another person through the investment of substantial resources (iv)
so as to cause material harm to the primary or related market for a product or
service containing that collection of information. Additionally, one could not
extract a substantial part of a collection of information so as to cause material
harm to the primary market for the collection of information. The goal of the
legislation was to protect the investment in databases by restoring the sweat of the
brow doctrine and ensuring protection for U.S. publishers under the EU Database
Directive through the establishment of a comparable regime here.
Many of the specific problems identified by the critics of H.R. 2652 existed
in H.R. 354 as well. According to these critics, H. 354 went far beyond
preventing database piracy and prevented legitimate reuse of information for
socially valuable purposes. Specifically, given the ambiguity of the term
"substantial part;" the second-generation publisher is at risk whenever he extracts
any information from an existing database; he has no way of knowing what the
first publisher, or a court; will consider "substantial."
Further, most if not all value-added databases harm a "related market,' for a
product containing the first collection of information. Indeed, the market for a
value-added database almost by definition is a related market for a product
containing the collection of information. H.R 354 contained a "reasonable use"
provision not found in H.R. 2652, but its terms were so vague as to provide little
comfort to most value-added publishers.
Another concern identified by opponents of H.R. 354 was sole source
databases. For many database markets, there is no feasible way for another person
12 See DATABASE DATA, DATABASE LAw IN THE 105TH CONGRESS, at http:/lwww.
databasedata.org/copytoc/1051inks/1051inks.html (last modified Sept. 13,2000).
13 Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Star. 2860 (1998).
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to collect the information independently. This may be because the information is
historical, and thus can be found only in an existing database, or because the
publisher has a special relationship with the producer of the information. The
protection afforded by HYR, 354 would have guaranteed these publishers
monopoly prices.
A final major concern was that notwithstanding the fifteen-year term limit,
H.R. 354 as a practical matter conferred perpetual protection for databases. This
would particularly be the case with dynamic online databases, where the second
publisher has no way of knowing for which portions of the database has
protection expired.
For these reasons, the opponents of H.R. 354 believed it would inflict serious
harm on many sectors of the economy that rely heavily on access to information.
Financial publishers such as Bloomberg and Dun & Bradstreet concluded that
H.R. 354 would increase the cost of the information they incorporate in their
products. Similarly, scientists felt that H.R. 354 would destroy the culture of
sharing information which is so integral to scientific progress and has maintained
U.S. scientific competitiveness for many decades.
In March 1999, the Intellectual Property Subcommittee held a hearing on
H.R. 354. The subcommittee "marked-up" the bill in May 1999, and a few days
later the full Judiciary Committee adopted it with no substantive debate.14
B. H.R. 1858: The Consumer and Investor Access to Information Act
On May 19, 1999, Representative Tom Bliley, Chairman of the House
Commerce Committee; Ranking Member Representative John Dingell; and the
chairmen and ranking members of the Telecommunications and Finance
Subcommittees, jointly introduced H.R. 1858, the Consumer and Investor Access
to Information Act.15 H.R. 1858 targeted parasitical copying of databases, without
prohibiting reuse of information to create new kinds of databases. 16 Specifically,
this bill prohibited a person from distributing a duplicate of someone else's
database in head-to-head competition with the first database. 17
By establishing a narrower prohibition than HKR 354, H.R. 1858 did not
prevent reuse of information in innovative databases. It dealt with the sole source
database problem by prohibiting misuse of the new protection. It eliminated the
chilling effect of frivolous litigation by vesting enforcement authority in the
14 See H.R Rep. No. 106-349, pt. 1, at 12 (1999).
15 H.R. 1858, 106th Cong. (1999).
16 See id
17 Seeid § 102.
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Federal Trade Commission rather than private parties. H.R. 1858 also had a more
comprehensive exemption for online service providers than H.R. 354-18
This narrow approach had widespread support among financial publishers,
the science, education, and research communities, Internet companies, and large
corporate users of information. They believed that this bill successfully balanced
concerns about database piracy with the need to use previously gathered
information as a foundation for new products.
The Telecommunications and Finance Subcommittees held hearings on
H.R. 1858 during June 1999.19 Those hearings highlighted the difference between
the two bills, and emphasized that the Judiciary Committee and the Commerce
Committee view the issue of database protection from different perspectives. The
Judiciary Committee is more concerned with protecting the publishers'
investment, while the Commerce Committee is more concerned with ensuring the
availability of information necessary for commercial activity.
H.R. 1858 was marked up in the Telecommunications and Finance
Subcommittees in July 1999. It was considered and passed by the full Commerce
Committee in early August 1999.
C. Senate Action
On January 19, 1999, Orrin Hatch, Chairman of the Senate Judiciary
Committee, placed a statement concerning database protection in the
Congressional Record.20 He attached to his statement, for discussion purposes,
three alternative bills: an early draft of H.R. 354; an early draft of H.R 1858; and
a draft his staff had produced during the 105th Congress based on H.R 2652. To
date, none of these bills has been formally introduced in the Senate.
Further, John McCain, Chairman of the Senate Commerce Committee,
introduced S. 95, also on January 19, 1999.21 While the other bills discussed
above proposed increased protection for databases, the McCain bill headed in the
other direction. It prohibited any limitation on the dissemination, by any medium
of mass communication, of stock trading information. 2
18 Compare id. § 104(b), with Collections of Information Antipiracy Act, H. 354, 106th
Cong. § 1404(c) (1999).
19 See generally The Consumer and Investor Access to Information Act of 1999: Hearing
on H.R. 1858 before the Subcommittee on Telecommunications, Trade, and Consumer
Protection of the Committee on Commerce, 106th Cong. (1999) [hereinafter Subcommittee on
Telecommunications]; The Consumer and Investor Access to Information Act of 1999: Hearing
on H.R. 1858 Before the Subcommittee on Finance and Hazardous Materials of the Committee
on Commerce, 106th Cong. (1999).
20 145 CONG REC. S316-326 (daily ed. Jan. 19,1999) (statement of Senator Hatch).
21 Id at S530 (introducing the Trading Information Act).
22 Id Senator McCain stated that "Americans must continue to have unfettered access
to... vital information" and that the Trading Information Act will help to ensure that access. Id
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The stock exchanges, particularly the New York Stock Exchange and
NASDAQ, had signaled support for H.R. 354. Financial publishers such as
Bloomberg, as well as stock brokerages such as Charles Schwab & Co., feared
that the exchanges would use broad database protection like HR. 354 to increase
the price of the live feeds of stock quotes, and otherwise restrict the downstream
use of this information. The drafters of S. 95 intended to resolve this dispute by
making stock information even more available than it is currently.23
D. Clinton Administration Position
The Clinton Administration concluded that there was a gap in existing
protection for databases that needs to be filled. It raised specific concerns with the
language of both H.R. 354 and H.R. 1858. With respect to H.R. 354, the
Administration believed that its scope was too broad. 4 It believed that only acts
of commercial distribution should be prohibited, and not acts of extraction
without further dissemination to the public. It had continued concerns regarding
perpetual protection and sole source databases. It also believed the definitions of
terms such as "related markets" needed to be tightened. The Administration
stressed that these concerns needed to be addressed in part to ensure that the
legislation did not run afoul of the First Amendment of the United States
Constitution. The Department of Justice in particular feared that restrictions on
the use of information could violate the fundamental right of free speech.
The Clinton Administration also voiced concerns with respect to
H.R. 1858.25 It stated that some terms were too broadly defined, and could result
in over-protection. At the same time, it claimed the absence of a private cause of
action would result in under-protection. It strongly applauded H.R. 1858's focus
on commercial misappropriation.
The Clinton Administration never signaled its preference of one bill over the
other. This is not surprising given that the debate between the two bills has
evolved in some measure into a political battle between two very powerful
congressional committees.
23 Although S. 95 targeted only stock trading information, Senator McCain indicated that
he was interested in the broader database issue.
24 Collections of Information Antipiracy Act: Hearing on H.R. 354 before the House
Subcommittee on Courts and Intellectual Property, 106th Cong. (Mar. 18, 1999) (statement of
Andrew J. Pincus, General Counsel, United States Department of Commerce) (on file with
Author).
2 5 See Subcommittee on Telecommunications, supra note 19 (statement of Andrew J.
Pincus, General Counsel, United States Department of Commerce).
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E. Federal Trade Commission Position
On June 30, 1999, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) issued testimony
concerning H.R. 18586. The testimony stated that H.R. 1858 successfully
addressed many of the concerns the FTC had raised in 1998 with respect to
H.R. 2652, the predecessor to H.R. 354. The FTC testimony identified a few
areas where the language of H.R. 1858 was ambiguous, particularly in the misuse
section2 7 The FTC also questioned whether it had sufficient resources to enforce
H.R. 1858's prohibitions28
F. Legislative Stalemate
After the House Commerce Committee passed H.R. 1858 in August
1999, database legislation in the 106th Congress ground to a halt. Rather
than choosing between H.R. 354 and H.R. 1858, the House Rules
Committee and the House Republican leadership urged the two
committees to reach a consensus. Intermittent negotiations between the
committee staffs failed to produce a compromise and both bills died with
the end of the 106th Congress.
III. INTERNATIONAL DIMENSIONS
A. Reciprocity under the EUDatabase Directive
Proponents of H.R. 354 argued that H2. 1858 did not offer comparable
protection to the EU Database Directive and therefore will not lead to reciprocal
protection under the Directive.2 9 The Administration publicly stated that the U.S.
should decide for itself what level of protection is appropriate for databases, and
not worry about comparability with the Directive. Underlying this position was
the realization that reciprocal protection was the outcome of a political process
involving negotiations between the U.S. and the ELU. In other words, the
substantive merits of comparability are a minor, if not insignificant factor in this
political process.
26 See Subcommittee on Telecommunications, supra note 19, at 78-88 (prepared statement
of the Federal Trade Commission).
27 See id
2 8 Seeid
29 Council Directive 96/9/EC of 11 March 1996 on the Legal Protection of
Databases, 1996 O.J. (L77) 20.
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B. WIPO Deliberations
As noted above, the WIPO in 1996 decided not to consider a database treaty
at the Diplomatic Conference. Since 1998, the WIPO has held two sessions of the
Standing Committee on Copyright and Related Rights to study the subject and
database protection was on the agenda of regional meetings co-sponsored by the
WIPO during the summer of 1999. While currently there seems to be no
significant momentum to deliberate the database protection issue in the WIPO, it
is likely that WIPO will pursue a database treaty after the U.S. enacts legislation.
This is because the U.S. at that time probably will join together with the EU in
placing great pressure on the WIPO to consider a database treaty very seriously.
A database treaty will prove controversial because the developing world will view
it as yet another stratagem by the developed world to impede the developing
world's progress.
IV. CONCLUSION
The drafters of database bills before the 106th Congress sought to head the
database industry, and arguably the economy as a whole, in dramatically different
directions. While H.R. 354 would have granted first-generation publishers a new
weapon against piracy, it would have also provided them with unprecedented
control over downstream competition. At the other end of the spectrum, S. 95
indicated that the database debate imposed risks on first generation publishers.
Congress may very well decide to deprive them of some of the protections they
now have. As noted above, many database publishers are de facto monopolists,
and Congress is appropriately suspicious of monopolies in the Information Age.
In between these two extremes, H.R. 1858 provides an incremental increase of
protection to first-generation publishers against pirates, without constraining
legitimate activities by second-generation publishers.
Balance in this area is critical. Information is the oxygen of the new
economy; drastic changes to information policy will hinder the expansion of the
Internet, impede research, and stifle entrepreneurship and innovation. As
Chairman Hatch stated, the U.S. Congress will consider the database issue within
the context of the "national Internet policy."
The EU adopted the Database Directive with relatively little public
participation. The database debate in the U.S., by contrast has involved all
stakeholders, including database publishers, Internet companies, commercial
users, libraries, universities, science organizations, and a range of financial
institutions. Accordingly, discussion of these issues has been far more robust in
the U.S., and is far more likely to produce a balanced result. Therefore, anyone in
a country without such discussion should closely monitor U.S. developments.
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As the debate proceeds in the U.S. and abroad, certain threshold questions
must be kept in mind: (1) Is additional protection truly needed?; (2) if so, what is
the harm which needs to be addressed?; and (3) is the legislation designed to cure
this harm drafted narrowly enough so as not to have unintended negative
consequences? Furthermore, discussion of the database protection issue should
reflect other fundamental domestic policies such as future development of the
economy and technology.
